The effect of wine policy on the emerging cold-hardy wine industry in the northern U.S. states  by Lee, Won Fy & Gartner, William C.
H O S T E D  B Y Available online at www.sciencedirect.comhttp://dx.doi.org/
2212-9774/& 20
Peer Review
nCorrespondin
E-mail addreicy 4 (2015) 35–44Wine Economics and Pol
www.elsevier.com/locate/wepThe effect of wine policy on the emerging cold-hardy wine industry
in the northern U.S. states
Won Fy Leea,n, William C. Gartnerb
aDepartment of Applied Economics, 253 Ruttan Hall, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, MN 55108, USA
bDepartment of Applied Economics, 248b Ruttan Hall, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, MN, 55108, USA
Received 12 January 2015; received in revised form 13 April 2015; accepted 17 April 2015
Available online 5 May 2015Abstract
The recent development of cold-hardy and disease-resistant grape cultivars have enabled rapid expansion of the wine industry in northern states
in the United States. As the nascent enterprises seek sustainable proﬁtability, it is important to understand what factors are making the industry
sustainable. Using the primary dataset collected in 2012 from 82 wineries currently operating across 10 northern states, this study examines how
state-level policies are inﬂuencing the revenue of the emerging wine industry. OLS and quantile regression methods are employed to account for
heterogeneous effects of policy instruments on sales of wineries. The empirical results show that policies directed at the wine industry have
heterogeneous effects on the revenue streams of wineries depending on the location of a winery along the revenue distribution curve of wineries
in northern U.S. states.
& 2015 UniCeSV, University of Florence. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Recent rapid expansion of the wine industry in northern U.S.
states, that were previously considered unsuitable for grape
production because of their cold climate, has been made feasible
by the development of cold hardy grape cultivars. There is no
accepted deﬁnition of what is a cold hardy grape but with the
introduction of Vitis riparia grape varieties the focus has shifted
from Vitis vinifera grapes that show some ability to survive cold
climates to V. riparia grapes bred exclusively for cold climates.
V. riparia traces its ancestry to the wild grape that exists in
northern forests in the United States. Through selective hybri-
dization, originally conducted by Elmer Swenson, considered
the father of cold hardy grapes, and continued at the University
of Minnesota, a number of V. riparia cultivars are in production
supplementing the V. vinifera cultivars that show some cold10.1016/j.wep.2015.04.002
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ss: leex5089@umn.edu (W.F. Lee).climate adaption. It was with the recent introduction of the
University of Minnesota hybrids that grape growing and winery
development in the northern states began to accelerate at a rapid
rate. It is estimated that one of the UM hybrids, Marquette,
released to the market in 2006 now accounts for almost 40% of
the “cold hardy” red wine grapes being grown in the northern
states (Tuck and Gartner, 2013a). The introduction and wide-
spread planting of V. riparia has led to a virtual boom in winery
development in the northern tier of the United States especially
in the Midwest and Eastern regions of the country (see Fig. 1).
Yet, little has been known about the economic impacts of cold
hardy grape production and resulting winery development in the
Midwest and Eastern northern states. That changed in 2012
when a study, conducted under the Northern Grapes project
surveyed grape growers and wineries in 14 states.1 Numerouslsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1The Northern Grapes project is funded by the USDA SCRI (United States
Department of Agriculture Specialty Crops Research Initiative) program and
involves personnel in over 12 states in the northeast and midwest. The project
is administered by Cornell University. It is intended to address viticulture,
enology and the marketing and economics of cold hardy grapes and wines
Fig. 1. Cumulative frequency of establishment year of wineries. .
Source: Northern Grape Project 2012 Survey Data
W.F. Lee, W.C. Gartner / Wine Economics and Policy 4 (2015) 35–4436state speciﬁc and summary reports have been published as a
result of that survey work. This paper uses part of that work and
examines winery production by looking at the effect of existing
state winery policies on winery operations.
The rapid recent increase in northern states wineries is
revealed in Fig. 1 which shows the cumulative frequency of
wineries by establishment year, indicating that more than 80%
of the sampled wineries have been established since the year
2000. With the increasing cultivation of cold-hardy grapes in
northern states in the United States, interest is growing
regarding sustained commercial viability of wineries. The
objective of this paper is to understand policy effects on the
revenue stream of wineries in northern states and to provide
some general insights on the operations of emerging industry
from empirical evidences.
The main contribution of this paper to the body of work on
the emerging wine industry in northern states is as follows. We
have compiled a detailed list of state-level policies directed at
the wine industry, and from these evaluated the impact of
policies on winery sales using primary data collected from
individual wineries located in the states of interest. To our best
knowledge, no other study investigates policy effects on the
wineries in northern states.
This study employs a semi-parametric quantile regression
method to explore the effect of policies on the emerging wine
industry using on-line survey data obtained from wineries in 10
states. The use of quantile regression allows us to evaluate the
differing effects of policy instruments on different segments of
the conditional distribution of the dependent variable. The rest of
this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews prior studies on
the effect of policy on economic outcomes of wineries. Section 3
describes data and policy instruments included in the empirical
estimation. Section 4 discusses the estimation methods. Section 5
presents the results of the empirical estimation. Finally, the
summary of ﬁndings and limitations are discussed in Section 6.2. Literature review
While factors affecting the production of a winery are multi-
faceted and difﬁcult to clearly identify, it is generally accepted that
government policy can play a critical role in determining market
outcome (Carew and Florkowski, 2012; Doloreux and Lord-Tarte,
2012; McFadden, 2006). Researchers have documented the extent
to which government policy affects the wine industry, at different
scales. For example, Wiseman and Ellig (2007) studied the impact
of the repeal of the prohibition of out-of-state direct shipment of
wine in the state of Virginia and found that the repeal narrowed the
retail price gap between online and brick-and-mortar businesses by
40%, which was considered an improvement in market efﬁciency
that beneﬁted both consumers and producers. Meloni and Swinnen
(2013), in their investigation of the historical origins of current
wine regulations in the European Union, note how hybrid vines(footnote continued)
made from them. The work reported in this paper was completed under a
subcontract to the University of Minnesota. Publications of Northern Grapes
Projects can be found at: http://northerngrapesproject.org/.were unable to prosper in France, on account of a politically-
charged implementation of a restrictive policy directed at produc-
tion of emerging hybrids.2
A number of studies have examined the importance of state-
level policy for an emerging industry. For example, Goodhue
et al. (2009) dynamic model shows that tax instruments directed
at wine production decrease the quantity produced. Doloreux and
Lord-Tarte (2012) explore the factors to which is attributed the
development of a wine industry in three Canadian provinces, and
asserts that weak policy support from the Quebec government
hampered the strong development of the industry in comparison
with other provinces such as Ontario and British Columbia.
Although the evidence on whether policy is closely correlated
with expansion of an emerging industry is mixed, the empirical
evidence supports the rationale for researchers to take policy factors
into consideration. Assessing to what extent policies inﬂuence
proﬁtability and sustainability of an emerging industry is a prudent
way to assist in the development of that industry.
The fact that winery owners perceive government policy as
the biggest challenge to their winery growth, followed closely
by sales, signiﬁes the importance of understanding policy
effects on the emerging northern states winery industry (see
Fig. 2). The research reported in this paper attempts to examine
the effect of policy instruments on the emerging wine industry
in northern states.3. Data
This study uses a sub-sample of a primary survey carried out
with winery operators and vine growers in 14 northern states in
2012. The primary goal of conducting the survey was to study
economic impact of the industry in each of the participating
states and asks sales-related and production-related questions
which often are not divulged by a privately held company. It2The appellation producers from Bordeaux, Champagne, or Burgundy
regions exerted a strong inﬂuence over the government policy-making process,
and to them is attributed the enactment of restrictive policies against emerging
hybrid producers (Meloni and Swinnen, 2013).
Fig. 2. What are the key challenges to growth and development of your
winery?
Source: Northern Grape Project 2012 Survey Data
Table 1
Northern Grape States.
State Freq. Percent Cum.
Illinois 8 9.76 9.76
Iowa 17 20.73 30.49
Michigan 9 10.98 41.46
Minnesota 14 17.07 58.54
Nebraska 6 7.32 65.85
New York 7 8.54 74.39
Wisconsin 8 9.76 84.15
South Dakota 5 6.10 90.24
Massachusetts 3 3.66 93.90
New Hampshire 5 6.10 100.00
Total 82 100.00
Table 2
Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Y[Total revenue]($) 552098.04 1350199.33 580 8,000,000 82
ZY[Wine Price]($) 11.53 2.99 5 22 82
ZL[Total Labor Exp]($) 117459.43 302392.64 0 1,600,000 82
ZG[Grape input](ton) 50.81 146.93 0.75 1100 82
ZM[Proxy for
motivation]
0.65 0.47 0 1 82
DA[Age of winery] 9.43 13.95 1 104 82
DL[Location] 0.80 0.39 0 1 82
H1[mult-outlet] 0.42 0.49 0 1 82
H2[Tasting-room] 0.45 0.50 0 1 82
H3[Tax] 1.5 2.563 0 9.029 82
H4[Farm-winery] 25.84 34.85 0 100 82
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could be obtained.
Grower and winery lists were provided by industry associa-
tions in each of the northern states. An email survey that was
designed to obtain information pertaining to sales and produc-
tion of wineries using primarily cold-hardy grapes in their
wine production in year 2011 was sent to all 2746 members of
these lists with a recorded overall response rate of 18% (501
responses).3 Additional 110 responses were obtained from
non-afﬁliated growers and wineries through a survey link
announced during the Northern Grape Project (NGP) webinars.
Overall, 611 survey responses were gathered from both
growers and wineries, of which 56% of them are growers,
35% were both growers and winery operators and 9% were
winery only operators (Tuck and Gartner, 2013b). Since
association memberships are open to all interested groups
regardless of their current operation status, those 169 survey
responses from non-growers, non-winery operators, non-
commercial growers and former growers were dropped and
not subjected to further analysis. Only a sub-sample of survey
respondents, essentially those related only to winery operations
were used in this study. Among the 794 operating wineries
from the association lists, 191 winery operators responded
which accounts for 24% response rate. After excluding
observations with missing responses for crucial variables used
in the analysis (e.g., production or sales variable) and exclud-
ing states with less than 3 observations, information from 10
states are included in the dataset used in the analysis.4 The
northern states included in the study are shown in Table 1.
The ﬁnal sample used in this study consists of 82 observa-
tions, which comprises 10.3% of the total number of wineries
included on industry association lists in the northern states.
Table 2 lists the descriptive statistics of the dependent and
explanatory variables used in the analysis. The average annual
sales of the wineries in the study area are $552,098, ranging3The winery survey consisted of 38 questions, whereas the grower survey
consisted of 72 questions pertaining to sales and management related
questions. The survey was conducted over a period of 6 weeks, with reminder
emails sent out around mid-way through the process.
4North Dakota, Connecticut, Maine and Vermont had less than 3 observa-
tions after dropping questionnaires with missing values for the crucial variables
and therefore, were eliminated from the analysis.from small sellers ($580) to sellers operating on a much large
scale ($8,000,000). Although the average age of the wineries is
less than 10 years, all of them are operating as a licensed
winery with a commercial purpose. The average price of a
bottle of wine produced in the study area is $11.53. The
majority of wineries (80%) are located in rural areas.5 One of
the more difﬁcult things to measure is owner's motivation. In
the original survey of Tuck and Gartner (2013b), winery
owners/managers indicated a strong sentiment (82% of the
wineries) for expanding the size of their operation. This may
be one indication of motivation but there are others. In this
study, m is the proxy variable for owner's motivation. It is a
binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the owner participated
in an award/competition event and zero if otherwise.3.1. Policy Instruments
Four policy variables were selected from a large pool of
policies that potentially affect winery operations. The selection
process of policy variables was conducted following a certain
set of rules. First, we chose variables that are thought to have a
direct impact on winery revenue. Second, we chose variables5Urban area includes cities with population greater than 2500.
Table 3
Policy variables
Northern states
IL IA MA MI MN NE NH NY SD WI
Market regulation
H1. Allow multiple outlets Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No
Tasting room
H2. Allow provide garnish No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Tax
H3. Excise tax (7–16% alcohol)($) 9.03 1.74 1.1 0.51 0.3 0.06 0 0.3 0.93 0.25
The estate winery
H4. Minimum in-state fruit content (%) No No No No 51 75 No 100 51 No
Fig. 3. Approximately what percent of your wine sales were to..? By
establishment period.
Source: Northern Grape Project 2012 Survey Data
6See for example, Shepherd (2012) for the discussion on the changes in the
level of local grape content requirement in Kansas that took place in year 2012.
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the purpose of econometric analysis. Lastly, we chose policy
variables that have been a popular topic of discussion in the
wine economics literature. Policy variables (H) included in the
analysis are shown in Table 3.
3.1.1. H1: market regulation
H1 is a binary variable that takes on the value of 1 if a state
allows wineries to have additional outlets outside its primary
production facility to show, sell and sample its products, and 0
otherwise. Intuitively, this policy instrument is expected to
have a positive impact on the revenue stream of wineries but it
may also be seen as a competitive issue for the small farm-
wineries (otherwise referred to as estate wineries although
legislation in some northern states speciﬁcally refers to them as
farm wineries) that do not have the market power to establish
multiple outlets. It also brings up the question of whether
wineries are primary tourist attractions or retail type outlets
that may serve as less regionally important secondary tourist
attraction.
3.1.2. H2: tasting room
All of the northern states included in this study permit on-
premise sales with some sort of minor permit fee requirements.
Since the lack of sample variation would not allow for
statistical analysis, an alternative variable that was considered
to capture the degree of regulation towards on-site sales isincluded. H2 is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the state
explicitly permits the wineries to offer bread and cheese with
wine on the tasting room porch or veranda and 0 if not. As can
be shown in Fig. 3, tasting room sales are a major source of
winery sales for northern wineries regardless of year of
establishment. A policy that facilitates a favorable environment
towards on-site sales is considered to have a direct impact on
the revenue of a winery.
3.1.3. H3: tax
There are three broad categories of taxes related to wine
production and sales: excise tax, value-added tax and import
duties tax. As the main interest of this study is to examine the
effect of tax on local wine production and its revenue, we
focus on excise tax which is a tax paid by the owners of
wineries. There is a quite a bit of variation in excise tax rate
among the study states. An increasing per-gallon marginal tax
rate should decrease quantity produced (Goodhue et al., 2009)
or impose pressure on wine price to increase which in turn,
might negatively impact winery sales or proﬁt.
3.1.4. H4: the farm (estate) winery
A minimum in-state fruit content regulation requires a
certain portion of grapes used in wine production to come
from locally sourced vineyards. As wine producers often
emphasize the importance of “terroir”, the characteristics that
are unique to the growing site and which reinforce the regional
identity for the produced wines, the intention of the regulation
is to facilitate the development of small farm/estate wineries
and their supporting industry (i.e. vineyards). However, the
direction of effect of the regulation can be ambiguous due to,
for example, inefﬁcient supply of grapes in times of high
demand from wineries.6
4. Empirical estimation
4.1. Conceptual framework
We use revenue of winery as the dependent variable as a proxy
for market performance of individual wineries. It is assumed that
W.F. Lee, W.C. Gartner / Wine Economics and Policy 4 (2015) 35–44 39the revenue function is represented as:
pUq p; z;m;D; Hð Þ ð1Þ
where p is the price of outputs produced by winery including
wine per gallon or other services. z is the vector of inputs,
exogenous vector of policy instruments denoted as H and
demand side factors such as age of winery and proximity of
winery to urban areas are denoted as D. In addition, we include
a proxy variable for owners motivation, m, following the
suggestions from previous literature that owner's motivation
plays an important role in an emerging wine industry (Morton
and Podolny, 2002; Valdemar and Jan, 2011).74.2. Econometric methods
The policy effects were estimated using ordinary least
squares (OLS) methods as well as quantile regression methods
(Koenker and Bassett, 1978). While OLS estimation exploits
changes in the conditional expected value of the dependent
variable given variations in explanatory variables, it has been
argued that OLS provides only a partial view of the relation-
ship. Quantile regression method is the least absolute deviation
estimation that yields the changes in the conditional quantile of
the dependent variable given variations in explanatory vari-
ables. As the quantile regression makes no distributional
assumption on the error term, the conditional quantile function
allows one to examine heterogeneous effect of the covariates
across quantiles.
The OLS model used in this paper is represented as:
ln Y ¼ p0þp1 ln Priceþp2 ln Laborþp3 ln Grape

þp4Motivationþp5Ageþ p6Location
þ
X4
j ¼ 1
pHjHjþε
)
ð2Þ
where the dependent variable is the log of revenue from
winery operations, ps' are the parameters to be estimated and
ε is the error term where Gaussian distribution is assumed. The
quantile regression model used in this paper is written as:
Qθ YjXð Þ ¼ p0θþp1θ ln Priceþp2θ ln Laborf
þp3θ ln Grape
þp4θMotivationþp5θAgeþp6θLocation7For example, Morton and Podolny (2002) include winery owner's motiva-
tion in the utility maximization problem that winery owners face. He argues
that the model has a different implication about the equilibrium of the wine
industry rather than the equilibrium derived from a traditional proﬁt max-
imization problem which is strictly a function of ﬁnancial returns. Since the
wineries in Northern states are mostly established recently, the assumption that
winery owner's attitude about the business plays an import role in production
seems plausible. Another support for the inclusion of owner's motivation
(proxied by award/competition participation) in the objective function comes
from a study conducted in Denmark where Valdemar and Jan (2011) ﬁnd that
owner's characteristics is a major factor affecting wine quality. They point out
that in the emerging Danish wine industry, producer reputation hardly exists
so, participation in awards competition can beneﬁt winery sales by gaining
public attention.þ
X4
j ¼ 1
pHjθHjþεθ
)
ð3Þ
where θ(0oθo1) represents the θth conditional quantile of
lnY given covariates, X.
Here, no distributional assumption is imposed on the error
term, εθ.
The quantile regression minimizes the asymmetric weighted
sum of absolute errors:
Q pθð Þ ¼min
p θ
XN
YZXi'α
θjYXi'αθjþ
XN
YoXi'α
ð1θÞjYXi'αθj
2
4
3
5
ð4Þ
Note that the quantile regression uses all available observations
(N) regardless of the value of θ. The rationale for employing a
quantile regression method in this study is mainly because it
enables us to explore the varying effects of explanatory variables,
including policy instruments, on the revenue maximizing beha-
vior of wineries across different points of the total revenue
distribution.8 The homoskedastic assumption of the error term in
the OLS method is rejected by the post-estimation test, which
implies heterogeneous effect of the covariates across the
quantiles.
5. Results
The estimated coefﬁcients from both OLS and quantile
methods are presented in Table 5. The direction of the policy
effects are mixed and some results are counter-intuitive. The
ﬁndings and its interpretations for each variable are given in
detail in the following subsections.
5.1. Price of wine
The coefﬁcient for pprice in OLS indicates the sign of the
price effect on winery revenue is not statistically signiﬁcant.
However, as can be seen in the quantile regression results, the
negative effect of price is more pronounced for wineries located
in the higher revenue distribution. In other words, the higher the
price of wine, the less revenue the winery obtains. This would
indicate that cold hardy wineries are operating in the elastic
portion of the demand curve. As price increases overall revenue
decreases. The relative signiﬁcance level as well as the size of
estimated coefﬁcients increases along the revenue distribution;
the negative correlation is an indication that cold hardy wine has
not developed a strong enough positive reputation to operate in
the inelastic portion of the demand curve. Wineries have to
focus on reducing costs and offering lower priced wines unless
they individually, or collectively, can develop a stronger brand8For example, concerning the direct shipment regulation, it is observed that
wine producers view of the particular regulation differs depending on the size
of winery production. Large-scale producers have relatively less to gain
ﬁnancially from the absence of regulations due to already well established
distribution network, whereas direct shipping is often a primary source of sales
for small-scale producers (Riekhof and Sykuta, 2005).
W.F. Lee, W.C. Gartner / Wine Economics and Policy 4 (2015) 35–4440identity leading to increased brand equity. The lack of a strong
brand identity for cold hardy wines is not surprising given the
relatively recent emergence of the winery industry in the
northern states. Increased marketing success which may include
competition awards will, over time, enhance brand identity
leading to increased brand equity and help move cold hardy
wines closer to the inelastic portion of the demand curve.
5.2. Labor and grape input
Consistent with production theory that assumes a ﬁrm
cannot increase their revenue while decreasing their input
levels at the same time, signs of p labor and pgrape areTable 4
Revenue distribution: by quantile.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Total revenue($): θ(0.1) 15019.1 10360.05 580 27,000 10
Total revenue($): θ(0.2) 42394.07 6009.01 32,000 50,000 11
Total revenue($): θ(0.3) 69956.28 11898.52 52,294 81,400 7
Total revenue($): θ(0.4) 100222.22 10721.21 82,000 110,000 9
Total revenue($): θ(0.5) 144355.55 20588.53 111,000 168,000 9
Total revenue($): θ(0.6) 215,300 22080.91 185,000 250,000 10
Total revenue($): θ(0.7) 356108.12 32748.86 300,000 400,000 8
Total revenue($): θ(0.8) 675602.55 224102.29 450,000 1,068,000 9
Total revenue($): θ(0.9) 3431370.22 2746625.36 1,114,000 8,000,000 9
Table 5
OLS and quantile regression results [Dep. V: log(Revenue)].
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS θ(0.1) θ(0.2) θ(0.3) θ(0.4)
pPrice 0.202 0.990 0.855 0.320 0.202
(0.478) (1.507) (1.601) (0.740) (0.642
pLabor 0.068
þ 0.123 0.224** 0.146*** 0.084*
(0.037) (0.087) (0.092) (0.042) (0.037
pGrape 0.589
*** 0.289 0.411 0.538*** 0.624*
(0.132) (0.277) (0.295) (0.136) (0.118
pMotivation 0.084 0.566 0.084 0.120 0.15
(0.351) (0.768) (0.816) (0.377) (0.327
pAge 0.019 0.020 0.013 0.023
þ 0.018þ
(0.015) (0.026) (0.027) (0.013) (0.011
pLocation 0.566
þ 0.965 0.176 0.248 0.186
(0.295) (0.892) (0.948) (0.438) (0.380
pH1 0.628
** 0.901 0.776 0.538 0.314
(0.311) (0.768) (0.816) (0.377) (0.327
pH2 0.771
þ 0.557 0.801 0.489 0.221
(0.520) (1.540) (1.637) (0.756) (0.656
pH3 0.172 0.468 0.239 0.190 0.159
(0.168) (0.693) (0.736) (0.340) (0.295
pH4 0.236þ 0.226 0.125 0.086 0.10
(0.123) (0.373) (0.397) (0.183) (0.159
Cons 4.178** 3.064 2.310 3.595* 4.049*
(1.781) (4.458) (4.736) (2.188) (1.899
N 82 82 82 82 82
Adj. R2 0.501 0.318 0.342 0.370 0.393
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
þpo0.15.
npo0.10.
nnpo0.05.
nnnpo0.01.positive and statistically signiﬁcant for both OLS and quantile
regression results. However, the labor input seems to a more
important factor for wineries in the middle or lower side the
revenue distribution curve. This may be due to the differential
effect of the amount of labor input needed for different size
wineries. This observed effect is consistent with the conven-
tional observation that farms in the early stages of develop-
ment tend to rely heavily on labor inputs than non-labor inputs
for production (Poulton et al., 2010). Table 4 represents the
size of revenue for wineries in different quantiles. It should be
noted that the size of wineries in terms of revenue varies
sharply between the wineries within θ A [0.2,0.7] and wineries
outside of the range. Also wineries in the θ A [0.2,0.7] shows
statistically signiﬁcant and economically non-trivial effect of
labor on the revenue stream.5.3. Motivation
Owner's motivation is a particularly important factor to be
considered in winery operations as non-monetary values that are
generated from winery operations can affect the revenue maximiz-
ing behavior of a winery. Somewhat consistent with Morton and
Podolny (2002)'s ﬁndings, a negative correlation between owner's
motivation and winery revenue is observed in relatively bigger size
ﬁrms. One possible interpretation of this ﬁnding is owners with(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
θ(0.5) θ(0.6) θ(0.7) θ(0.8) θ(0.9)
0.178 0.278 0.267 0.474 0.547
) (0.520) (0.496) (0.457) (0.587) (0.495)
* 0.077** 0.068** 0.041þ 0.022 0.027
) (0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.034) (0.028)
** 0.630*** 0.602*** 0.629*** 0.610*** 0.591***
) (0.096) (0.091) (0.084) (0.108) (0.091)
0 0.256 0.309 0.378* 0.384 0.255
) (0.265) (0.253) (0.233) (0.299) (0.252)
0.016* 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.026***
) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
0.217 0.295 0.287 0.245 0.826***
) (0.308) (0.294) (0.271) (0.348) (0.293)
0.127 0.002 0.027 0.343 0.643**
) (0.265) (0.253) (0.233) (0.299) (0.252)
0.049 1.082** 1.118** 0.906þ 0.592
) (0.532) (0.507) (0.467) (0.600) (0.506)
0.326 0.417þ 0.440** 0.216 0.048
) (0.239) (0.228) (0.210) (0.270) (0.227)
0 0.032 0.241þ 0.232** 0.205 0.174
) (0.129) (0.123) (0.113) (0.146) (0.123)
* 5.284*** 5.851*** 5.897*** 7.015*** 7.639***
) (1.538) (1.469) (1.352) (1.737) (1.463)
82 82 82 82 82
0.422 0.455 0.490 0.526 0.567
W.F. Lee, W.C. Gartner / Wine Economics and Policy 4 (2015) 35–44 41high passion for their wine production choose to operate their
wineries in a manner that maximizes their own utility, rather than
proﬁts.
5.4. Location and age of winery
The proximity of winery to an urban area as well as the age of
winery are included in the model to account somewhat for the
demand side of winery revenue. The age of winery appears to
have a consistent effect, regardless of the location, with respect to
revenue distribution. A one year increase in the age of a winery is
associated with a 2–3% increase in winery revenue. Wineries
located near populous areas are correlated with higher revenue
holding other covariates constant suggesting that marketing and
proximity to market can be a signiﬁcant issue in the growth of a
winery. The highly signiﬁcant effect for the wineries at the top
quantile buttresses this possible explanation.
5.5. Policy instruments9
5.5.1. H1: market regulation
The sign of the pH1, the coefﬁcient for “Allow Multiple
outlets”, is positive for the OLS model as expected and
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Allowing wineries to
have offpremise outlets to promote their products improves
their revenue. This is to be expected as multiple outlets
increase exposure and opportunities for increased sales.
Quantile regression estimates indicate that the policy has a
positive and signiﬁcant effect on the revenue for wineries on
the top quantile of revenue distribution.
The issue of multiple outlets is simple enough when
interpreted only from a revenue enhancement viewpoint.
Allowing multiple outlets increases the revenue for each
winery that takes advantage of them. However, the policy
implication runs much deeper than simply revenue enhance-
ment. Some states do not allow multiple outlets instead
focusing their attention on the point of production and most
sales which is the farm/estate winery. Farm wineries are
primary tourist attractions. They are mostly found in rural
areas (Tuck and Gartner, 2013b), are relatively small with
respect to total production and attract visitors to their place of
operation instead of shipping the product to where a customer
can more easily ﬁnd them (e.g. local liquor store or additional
outlet in high trafﬁc areas). The overall economic impact of
cold hardy grape and wine production was estimate at $401
million in 2011. Of that total 26.4% ($105.7 million) was due
to tourism (Tuck and Gartner, 2014). Obviously there are
differences in regions where wineries are located with respect
to their reliance on tourism. For example New York, one of the
states included in the Northern Grapes project is a major wine9Severe multicollinearity among policy variables may cause unstable
estimates and inﬂated standard errors for the variables of interest. A multi-
collinearity test is conducted using a variance inﬂation factor (VIF) measure.
All individual VIF measures as well as the mean VIF are well below the
conservative threshold of 5, indicating no evidence of multicollinearity
problems. As a rule of thumb, VIF measure greater than 10 is considered
severe collinearity that is problematic (Kennedy, 2003).producer. They have areas that are tourism dependent such as
the Fingers Lakes region and other areas where winery revenue
is much less dependent on tourism and relying more on off
premise sales. Other states in the project such as Minnesota
and Wisconsin are comprised of small scale “farm” wineries
and heavily dependent on tourism for revenue. Where wineries
are heavily reliant on tourism revenue for growth the issue of
whether multiple outlets are beneﬁcial becomes more challen-
ging. There is a major difference between primary and
secondary tourist attractions. Primary attractions pull people
into an area. Secondary attractions support primary attractions
by increasing activity options and/or shopping opportunities.
As a stand-alone operation secondary attractions have very
little drawing power. The questions that arise from the policy
of allowing multiple outlets are many and so far have no
answers. They are: Do rural economies partially tied to winery
operations perform better in single outlet versus multiple outlet
states? Is competition enhanced or repressed by allowing a
single winery to open multiple outlets. In other words, does the
existence of multiple outlets absorb demand such that a new
winery would not be considered feasible? Does brand building
beneﬁt from a single outlet versus a multiple outlet operation?
These questions may not be important for an established
winery that relies on off premise sales for the bulk of its
revenue but for those wineries that rely on tourists, and that
appears to be the majority of wineries operating in the northern
states, the policy of allowing multiple outlets is important not
only to them but the region in which they are located.
Currently there is no research underway that addresses these
questions yet as the farm/estate winery sector expands and
with it the fortunes of rural tourism economies tied to it they
need to be answered.
5.5.2. H2: tasting room
As mentioned in the previous section, all of the northern
states included in this study permit on-premise sales with some
sort of minor permit fee requirement. This led us to include the
H2 as a proxy for a policy that supports tasting room sales.
OLS estimate shows a positive effect of the policy on winery
revenue at the 15% level. The sizable and statistically
signiﬁcant effects become noticeable for wineries of revenue
size greater than the 60th percentile of distribution. Our dataFig. 4. Minimum in-state fruit content requirement: by revenue and production
quartile.
Source: Northern Grape Project 2012 Survey Data
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absence of the policy, can range from 70% to 112% on winery
revenue. We can infer from this result and Fig. 4 that policies
that are related to tasting room sales are the important factors
affecting winery revenues in the northern states. The vast
percentage of winery sales, over 50%, take place in the tasting
room (Tuck and Gartner, 2013b). The percentage of tasting
room sales increases for small farm/estate wineries in single
outlet states. Therefore any policy that affects the operation of
a tasting room is bound to have signiﬁcant effects on the
overall revenue of a farm/estate winery. It is interesting to note
that the size and statistical signiﬁcance of the effect increases
considerably at the upper tail of distribution. This may be due
to the fact that wineries in northern states are in a relatively
early stage where the marginal revenue from tasting room
operations increases as the size of the winery increases. In
other words, larger wineries tend to attract more visitors and
have a more favorable sales environment including on site
inducements (e.g. special events, live music) than small-scale
wineries.
5.5.3. H3: tax
The marginal excise tax rate does not show a meaningful
effect on winery sales for OLS estimation. As mentioned
previously, a negative correlation between marginal tax rates
and winery revenues has been documented in a previous study
(Goodhue et al., 2009). However, the quantile regression result
indicates, in general, a positive effect of excise tax on the
winery revenue. For wineries located in 70th–80th percentile
of distribution, a 1% increase in excise tax is correlated with
increase of 0.4% in revenue. This counter-intuitive effect
found in our results may be due to the fact that the share of
state imposed excise taxes as a proportion of total price is quite
small. It was observed that the share of state excise tax is less
than 3.3% of total sales for the majority of the wineries in the
northern states.10 However, further analysis remains to be done
to fully understand the effect of taxation policies. Only one
state, Illinois, has an excise tax that is considered high
compared to the other states.
5.5.4. H4: the ‘farm/estate’ winery
Statistically signiﬁcant negative effects of pH4, meaning as
minimum fruit content increases revenue decreases, is interest-
ing but needs to be paid careful attention to in the interpretation.
As mentioned previously, the minimum in-state fruit content
regulation requires a certain portion of grapes used in wine
production to come from locally sourced vineyards. Some states
have this policy embedded in their winery legislation (e.g.
Minnesota) whereas others (e.g. Michigan) allow for organiza-
tions to impose their own standards. Wineries that do not want
to follow non-mandated minimum state fruit requirements do
not have their wines certiﬁed by the independent organization.
There has been no research conducted as to the effect of
voluntarily adopting non-binding organizational minimum fruit10The data shows that 75% of wineries in the sample have share of excise
tax less than 3.3% of their total sales.requirements on revenue. This is the ﬁrst study that has
attempted to do so and only those states that have the minimum
in state fruit requirement embedded in their winery legislation
are compared against those that do not. The presence of an
independent organization that has its own in-state fruit require-
ments was not considered. What appears clear is that the
intention of a mandated minimum in state fruit requirement
regulation is to facilitate the development of small farm/estate
wineries. As mentioned previously if farm/estate wineries are
considered to be primary tourist attractions the requirement of
more than 50% of the grapes used in the production of the wine
sold is locally sourced enhances the uniqueness of the product.
Unique products give rural tourism economies and their local
businesses greater competitiveness. This is the rationale behind
designated viticulture areas and protections to producers located
in those areas. It was, therefore, surprising to see that our OLS
estimates show a 1 percentage point increase in the minimum
fruit requirement is correlated with an 0.2% decrease in revenue,
holding other covariates constant.
In 2012, Kansas cut its minimum in-state fruit requirement
from 60% to 30%. There was heated discussion on the
potential directional effect of the change in the minimum
requirement. Proponents argued that they would not have to
worry about sourcing grapes that are in shortage, that the new
law would enable wineries to more effectively engage in
winery operations and that the law would boost their wine
production and sales. On the other hand, opponents were
largely concerned with the loss of “identity” of Kansas wines
as well as the loss of opportunity in agro-tourism. The result of
this study appears to support the arguments made by the
proponents of the new law. The result shows that an increase
in minimum in-state fruit content requirement negatively
correlates with winery revenue. However, as we saw in
Section 6.1, wineries are operating in the elastic portion of
the demand curve, which indicates their current status of
lacking brand identity and equity. Inferring from the previous
ﬁndings that show the price of Bordeaux wine is determined
primarily by objective characteristics that appear on the label
of the bottle (i.e. growing site characteristics, reputation), not
necessarily quality or taste (e.g. Ali and Nauges, 2007;
Combris et al., 1997), as well as the growing importance of
reputation of growing site as a signiﬁer of quality in the U.S.
(e.g. Loureiro, 2003), one may argue against a relaxed
minimum fruit content law when it comes to long-run
sustainability of the winery operations in the northern states.
6. Conclusion
6.1. Summary
In this paper, we study the effects of six policy instruments
on the revenues of wineries in northern states. Quantile
regression methods are employed to examine the effects of
policy, in addition to standard OLS regression, in order to
exploit the ability to examine heterogeneous effects across the
distribution of winery revenue. The results of this paper can be
summarized as follows: First, the policy instrument directed at
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sales as a size of a winery increases. This directly relates to the
ﬁnding that, on average, two-thirds of the total winery revenue
is generated from tasting room sales. We also ﬁnd that the
effect is more prominent for wineries with a higher volume of
revenue, which suggests that the policy helps larger wineries
that are relatively well established more than small wineries
that have just begun to operate. The high up-front costs of
building a tasting room may be a challenge for start-up
wineries in attracting more visitors to their winery. Second,
the minimum in-state fruit content requirement appears to be
an interesting and important state policy that reveals a negative
effect on winery revenue. This ﬁnding supports the laissez 
faire argument made by the opponents of the law. However,
further studies may be needed to identify the causal effects of
the policy. The potential problems that might exist in our
analysis are described in detail in the following limitation
section. Moreover, when it comes to the long-term sustain-
ability of emerging wine production in northern states, the
importance of the growing site and brand value in price
determination (e.g. Schamel, 2006) as well as consumer
demand (e.g. Johnson and Bruwer, 2007), combined with the
nature of wine agro-tourism complimenting wine production
(e.g. Carlsen, 2004; Getz and Brown, 2006), may result in
quite different results, than we observed in this study.
Third, we ﬁnd that market regulations that allows multiple
outlets have positive effect on the revenue for those wineries of
larger size, while the restrictions shows no impact on the sales
of small wineries. However we do note the potential impacts on
rural tourism economies tied to winery operations. Without a
full understanding of this policy on tourism development the full
economic effects of the policy cannot be determined. One area
that is related to distribution but was not studied due to lack of
data was the effect of a prescribed distributor on revenue. Some
states require a winery sell only to a licensed distributor which
in turn can sell to retail outlets (e.g. liquor store, restaurant). The
ﬁnding that only 1% of the wine produced in the northern states
is sold in a restaurant setting runs counter to the local foods
argument frequently advocated and embraced by local restau-
rants (Tuck and Gartner, 2013b) Obviously market regulations
play a role but just as with multiple outlets the answers are
elusive. Much more work is needed to study the direct and
indirect effects of market and distribution regulations including,
but not limited to, the effect of allowing multiple outlets.
Lastly, contrary to previous literature, we ﬁnd somewhat
positive or, at best, no statistically signiﬁcant effects of excise
tax on revenue. The lack of notable effects of an excise tax on
winery sales is contrary to the previous ﬁndings in the
literature and should be studied further.
Another ﬁnding that is not policy related, but still has some
important implications, is that wineries in northern states are
located in the elastic portion of the demand curve. Given that
brand value is an important factor that determines the price of
wine, and demand which directly impacts the proﬁtability of
the wineries, the accumulation of brand value should be taken
as a major strategy to secure the sustainable development of
the emerging wineries.This study has practical implications for policy makers and
winery owners in northern states. Our results show that the quantile
regression methods allow us to investigate the differing effects of
covariates depending on the revenue volume of wineries, which
offers a more complete picture of the policy effects as compared to
conditional mean OLS estimates.
As the results of this study show, a particular policy instrument
can have heterogeneous effect on economic outcomes depending
on the various percentiles of the outcome distribution.6.2. Limitations
The biggest challenge of this study comes from the difﬁculty
of isolating the heterogeneous characteristics that are unique to
the individual states (e.g., weather, precipitation, soil quality,
or institutional characteristics) that affect the revenue stream of
wineries. Ignoring the non-random nature of policy can cause
bias in estimating the true impact of the policy instruments
directed at the wine industry.
For example, regarding the negative and statistically sig-
niﬁcant effects of minimum instate fruit content requirement in
our results, those wineries that are located at the lower tail of
revenue or production distribution in the northern states tend to
belong to the group of states that impose higher minimum
requirements. On the other hand, wineries that yield higher
levels of revenue or production tend to be located in the states
with a low minimum requirement (see Fig. 4).
What is unclear here is the direction of the effect. It might be
the case that a minimum fruit content requirement law impedes
the growth of wineries or, given that most of the wineries in
northern states were established after 2000, it could well be the
case that small farm/estate wineries have an advantage when
located in a state that has the highest minimum requirement
law. Competition is more even when all wineries have to use a
minimum amount of locally sourced product. Thus, the result
of this study should not be taken as an identiﬁcation of a causal
relationship, but rather viewed as conveying predictive power
in a statistical sense.6.3. Concluding remarks
This paper shows that policies do have differential effects
depending on the location and size of a winery. The underlying
issue becomes what direction state policy makers want their
wine industry to follow. For encouraging larger winery
operations polices that require sales through a distributor,
allow multiple outlets and eliminate minimum fruit require-
ments should be considered. For smaller wineries, polices that
require minimum fruit requirement and enhance the tasting
room environment should be encouraged. The issue of whether
a winery is a primary tourist attraction needs also to be
considered. Revenue enhancement is possible through multiple
outlet sales but the impact on rural economies tied to winery
operations may not beneﬁt from this policy. What this study
has done is to show that winery policies are having effects on
winery revenues. Whether those effects are in the right
W.F. Lee, W.C. Gartner / Wine Economics and Policy 4 (2015) 35–4444direction was not the intent of this paper. That argument rests
with all the stakeholders connected to winery operations.
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